Afghanistan\u2019s political history, especially the bloody events of the 1990s, remains subject to conflicting and often reductive narratives. One example is the reinterpretation of the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hezb-i Wahdat) through the lens of Hazara versus non-Hazara conflict\u2014 a narrative that emphasizes ethnic affiliations at the expense of the complex political, organizational, and ideological dynamics of that era.<\/p>\n
My respected friend, Mr. Habibullah Faheemi, in a note titled \u201cCheap Seller\u201d written on the anniversary of the martyrdom of Seyyed Mustafa Kazemi, refers to what he calls martyr Mazari\u2019s trust in martyr Kazemi and Kazemi\u2019s subsequent cooperation with Ahmad Shah Massoud as a betrayal of the Hazaras\u2019 trust.<\/p>\n
He then raises questions about Mazari\u2019s naivety and recalls the fate of Akbar Shah Warsi, extending the issue from critiquing a single political figure\u2019s actions to the broader question of the historical trust Hazaras place in others.<\/p>\n
The fundamental problem with his piece is not questioning Kazemi\u2019s performance but rather the interpretive framework chosen by the author. Within this framework, Hezb-i Wahdat is assumed to be a “party of the Hazaras,” and its internal political disagreements are ultimately linked to the loyalty or disloyalty of non-Hazara figures toward Hazaras.<\/p>\n
To assess the validity of this view, several topics must be examined separately, including the party\u2019s nature and founding identity and the backgrounds and causes of its internal conflicts.<\/p>\n
In this note, I will attempt to clarify some points around these issues.<\/p>\n
1. The Nature of Hezb-i Wahdat: Shia Political Coalition or Ethnic Organization?<\/p>\n
Hezb-i Wahdat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan was established on July 16, 1989 (25th of Saratan 1368 in the Persian calendar) in Bamyan after nearly two years of efforts to end the fragmentation among Shia political and jihadi factions.<\/p>\n
This party resulted from the unification of previously independent groups operating under separate leaderships and, at times, hostile relationships.<\/p>\n
The founding flows included Nasr Organization of Afghanistan, Pasdaran-e Jihad-e Islami, the Islamic Movement, Shura-ye Ittifaq-e Islami, and several smaller parties; despite political and organizational differences, these groups shared a key feature\u2014their Shia faith.<\/p>\n
The late Ustad Erfani Yakawlangi, a key figure in forming the party, recorded documents and discussions of this alliance in his book \u201cHezb-i Wahdat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan: From Congress to Congress.\u201d<\/p>\n
Pages 26\u201328 outline the initial agreements among the named jihadi groups, and pages 67\u201368 contain the \u201cCharter of the Union of Islamic Shia Mujahideen Organizations of Afghanistan.\u201d<\/p>\n
The title and contents of this charter show that the unity sought by the founders was based on shared religious and political beliefs of Shia groups, not Hazara or ethnic unification.<\/p>\n
They aimed to create a joint organization to end internal divisions and strengthen the political and military position of the Shia community within Afghanistan\u2019s power equations.<\/p>\n
Article Two of Hezb-i Wahdat\u2019s statute, approved on October 9, 1991 (17th of Mehr 1370) and republished in its revised form, states:<\/p>\n
“This party possesses an Islamic and national identity founded on a monotheistic worldview and Islamic ideology, and any deviation from this principle will be tantamount to dissolution.”<\/p>\n
This statement, alongside the establishment of a High Supervisory Council and the consideration of special jurisprudential and scholarly conditions for its members, indicates that the Shia religious identity was not merely cultural or social but held a central legal and organizational position within Hezb-i Wahdat.<\/p>\n
Some historical sources, including writings cited from Bessir Ahmad Dawlatabadi\u2019s book \u201cIdentity of Afghanistan\u2019s Political Parties and Movements,\u201d mention adherence to the principle of the Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) as part of the party\u2019s foundational principles.<\/p>\n
Yet even without this citation, existing documents suffice to prove Islamic and Shia identity\u2019s centrality in the party\u2019s creation.<\/p>\n
This emphasis does not deny the historic role of Hazaras in Hezb-i Wahdat. The majority of its members, military forces, and social base were Hazara.<\/p>\n
One might say that during martyr Mazari\u2019s tenure as secretary-general, the demands for redressing the historical discrimination against Hazaras, just power-sharing, and recognition of their political rights instead of solely Shia rights became a prominent part of the party\u2019s discourse.<\/p>\n
Nematullah Ebrahimi, in his 2009 study titled “The Decline of the Political Capital of Afghanistan’s Hazaras,” published by the Crisis Studies Center at the London School of Economics, explains this transformation. He writes that while Hezb-i Wahdat was originally formed through an alliance of Shia Islamist factions, it gradually became the principal platform for articulating the political demands of Hazaras.<\/p>\n
Martyr Mazari\u2019s own words also hold special significance for understanding the party\u2019s nature.<\/p>\n
In one speech collected in the \u201cReviving Identity\u201d series, when discussing relations among Hazaras, Sayyids, and Qizilbash, he refers to the party\u2019s Central Council composition, stating that out of 160 members, over forty were Sayyids. He emphasized the necessity of avoiding discrimination and division based on ethnic or genealogical lines.<\/p>\n
This statement is crucial because the then secretary-general portrayed non-Hazara presence in party leadership as natural and integral, not exceptional or alien to Hezb-i Wahdat\u2019s identity.<\/p>\n
Consequently, it is essential to distinguish among three concepts: the party\u2019s founding origin and identity, the social composition of its members and supporters, and the political discourse that developed during subsequent developments.<\/p>\n
These concepts are not necessarily identical. A party might be ideologically Shia, socially based mainly on Hazaras, and politically champion ethnic or religious demands or both.<\/p>\n
Thus, describing Hezb-i Wahdat as an exclusively Hazara organization without explaining these distinctions provides an incomplete picture of its history.<\/p>\n
2. Non-Hazara Presence in Hezb-i Wahdat\u2019s Leadership<\/p>\n
The leadership makeup of Hezb-i Wahdat also demonstrates that it cannot be defined solely by ethnic boundaries.<\/p>\n
Non-Hazara figures, including Sayyids and other Afghan Shia, participated in founding organizations, the Central Council, the High Supervisory Council, and other party political frameworks.<\/p>\n
This presence was substantive, not symbolic, with some of these individuals playing key roles in major political, organizational, and military decisions of the party.<\/p>\n
Besides Hazaras and Sayyids, other ethnicities were represented among influential party members, such as Qari Ahmad Ghor Darwazi and Nuri Shulgar, along with dozens more who were neither Hazara nor Sayyid.<\/p>\n
The essential point is that ethnic affiliation alone was not the criterion for membership, leadership participation, or political positioning within Hezb-i Wahdat.<\/p>\n
3. Nature of Internal Disagreements<\/p>\n
Understanding the reasons behind Hezb-i Wahdat\u2019s internal disputes requires looking back to the years preceding its formation.<\/p>\n
The organizations united under one political umbrella in 1989 had competed for leadership, regional influence, resources, and external relations for many years before.<\/p>\n
The discord between Nasr Organization and Pasdaran-e Jihad Islami was one of the main examples of these rivalries, sometimes leading to years of armed clashes in certain regions.<\/p>\n
In fact, one of the primary motivations for forming Hezb-i Wahdat was to end these conflicts.<\/p>\n
However, formal unification did not erase organizational loyalties, personal relations, or political rivalries among influential figures immediately.<\/p>\n
Late Erfani documented the difficulties in reaching agreement on leadership structure, representative composition, and organizational integration during negotiations in Punjab, Lal, Behsud, and Bamyan.<\/p>\n
These records show that organizational disagreements were a core challenge during the party\u2019s formation and, notably, these rivalries persisted even after its establishment.<\/p>\n
At Hezb-i Wahdat\u2019s first national congress in Bamyan in 1991, representatives of former organizations still voted based on prior affiliations.<\/p>\n
This reality indicates that organizational identities endured even after the formal dissolution of previous structures.<\/p>\n
Nematullah Ebrahimi\u2019s studies of Hezb-i Wahdat leadership changes highlight the continuation of these factions: former members of Nasr mainly supported martyr Mazari, while most ex-Pasdaran members aligned with Mohammad Akbari.<\/p>\n
These evidences emphasize organizational loyalties\u2019 role in forming internal party factions.<\/p>\n
From this perspective, the disagreement between martyr Mazari and Mr. Akbari must also be examined in light of their organizational backgrounds.<\/p>\n
Before Hezb-i Wahdat\u2019s establishment, these two figures operated in distinct organizations, each with their own political networks, commanders, and loyal forces that all came under one party banner.<\/p>\n
These disagreements were compounded by leadership competition, divergent decision-making styles, and relations with other Mujahideen groups.<\/p>\n
4. Divergent Political Strategies and Coalition Issues<\/p>\n
After the fall of Najibullah\u2019s government and the Mujahideen’s rise to power, Hezb-i Wahdat entered a new political phase.<\/p>\n
Historical organizational disputes mingled with new questions about power-sharing, relations with Burhanuddin Rabbani\u2019s government, ties with Ahmad Shah Massoud, and how to engage with the Kabul wars.<\/p>\n
These conflicts were not personal but stemmed from differing strategies regarding the party\u2019s position in the power structure.<\/p>\n
Some leaders advocated military pressure and confrontation to achieve political goals, while others favored cooperation or agreements with the government and allied forces.<\/p>\n
This strategic divide, alongside earlier rivalries, led to a bifurcation within the party.<\/p>\n
Critics\u2019 narratives shed light on this aspect, too.<\/p>\n
In the 16th issue of the “Shola Javid” publication, discussing factions within Hezb-i Wahdat and Harakat-i Islami, it is emphasized that factional forces cannot be exclusively categorized as Hazara or non-Hazara.<\/p>\n
This narrative notes the presence of Hazaras in Akbari\u2019s faction and non-Hazaras in Khalili\u2019s faction.<\/p>\n
Although “Shola Javid” holds distinct ideological positions and criticizes Shia Islamist currents, its testimony shows that even outsiders do not find clear ethnic boundaries defining these factions.<\/p>\n
Hence, Hezb-i Wahdat\u2019s split cannot be solely attributed to Hazara versus non-Hazara conflict, as leaders and members from both groups appeared on opposing sides and non-Hazara figures held varied political positions.<\/p>\n
For example, the presence of Mr. Amini Ashtarlay, Afkari Shahrestani, and scores of other Hazara alongside Mr. Akbari, as well as Sayyed Mohammad Sajadi, Ala Rahmati, Yazdanshenas Hashemi and numerous non-Hazara personalities alongside martyr Mazari after the party\u2019s division, clearly reflects the true nature of the rivalries.<\/p>\n
5. Critique of a Reductionist Narrative<\/p>\n
With these clarifications, we return to the main issue in the note “Cheap Seller.”<\/p>\n
Mr. Faheemi has the right to question martyr Kazemi\u2019s actions, political stance changes, and possible role in Bamyan military events. Such questioning is part of critically reassessing Afghanistan\u2019s history.<\/p>\n
But there is a fundamental difference between critiquing a political figure\u2019s performance and framing his behavior as an issue of ethnic loyalty or betrayal.<\/p>\n
The author mentions Mazari\u2019s trust in Kazemi and then portrays Kazemi\u2019s cooperation with the Nishar Council as abusing Hazaras\u2019 trust, ignoring the fact that Hezb-i Wahdat was not Mazari\u2019s personal property to lose trust in an influential party figure.<\/p>\n
Mazari\u2019s trust in Kazemi primarily reflects Kazemi\u2019s role within the party leadership and political relations of the time, not a gift or token.<\/p>\n
This trust cannot be interpreted as representing one ethnic group\u2019s trust in another without evidence; similarly, subsequent political disputes are not inherently signs of ethnic betrayal.<\/p>\n
Mr. Faheemi’s article attributes the phrase “party of the Hazaras” to the late Ayatollah Mohseni.<\/p>\n
This expression is not documented in any source from the late Mohseni; it was mentioned by martyr Mazari in a speech. Even if we do not treat it as an accusation and accept Mohseni\u2019s attribution, it remains a political characterization from an outsider that cannot replace foundational documents, statutes, and leadership realities.<\/p>\n
Another issue in the article is generalizing historical disputes into the problem of Hazaras\u2019 trust in non-Hazaras.<\/p>\n
If evaluation is based on political actions, each figure should be judged by their decisions, actions, and responsibilities\u2014not ethnic or genealogical background.<\/p>\n
6. History Should Not Be Reduced to Inherited Hostilities<\/p>\n
Despite its successes, failures, and conflicts, Hezb-i Wahdat represents one of the most significant political organizational experiences of Afghanistan\u2019s Shia community in modern history.<\/p>\n
The party also played a decisive role in highlighting Hazaras\u2019 political demands.<\/p>\n
Neither reality should negate the other.<\/p>\n
Also, internal conflicts stemmed from a complex set of historical factors, including rivalries among defunct parties, power relations, differing political strategies, military alliances, and social and ethnic contexts. Reducing this complex picture to a Hazara versus non-Hazara rivalry neither aligns with the party\u2019s foundational documents nor explains its subsequent splits adequately.<\/p>\n
Historical reexamination is useful when it starts from documents and arrives at reasoned judgments, not when it begins with unproven ethnic assumptions and rearranges past events to fit those preconceptions.<\/p>\n
Criticizing political leaders is necessary and should not be selective.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, turning their disputes into lasting ethnic mistrust serves neither truth nor progress beyond Afghanistan\u2019s bitter civil war legacy.<\/p>\n
Seyyed Ahmad Mousavi Mubaligh<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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