On the Edge: Iran and the US—War or Agreement?
It has been 47 years since the confrontation between Iran and the United States began. This confrontation has reached its peak during Trump’s presidency, both in his previous term and the current one.
It seems that the confrontation between Iran and the US under Trump is different from all previous periods. In the previous term, General Qassem Soleimani, a prominent Iranian strategist, was assassinated in Baghdad under Trump’s orders. Subsequently, the Iranians threatened to retaliate by targeting US bases. Trump mockingly addressed Ayatollah Khamenei, saying: “Hit us. Why don’t you hit us?” To everyone’s surprise, the US base in Ain al-Asad, Iraq, was struck. For the first time since World War II, a US military base was attacked, breaking a long-standing record. Ultimately, the tension stopped just short of an all-out war.
In this term as well, after taking office, Trump escalated tensions by issuing threats and deadlines. Amid negotiations and tensions, Israel attacked Iran at dawn on June 13, killing some of Iran’s highest-ranking commanders. Then, 18 hours after Israel’s strike and amid shock and astonishment, Iran retaliated by targeting Tel Aviv. Israel’s three-layer defense system was breached to some extent and partially stood aside as spectators.
When the US saw that Israel could not achieve its objectives alone and that it took as much damage as it dealt—though Iran suffered far greater human losses—it entered the conflict itself. Contrary to international norms, the US bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump then claimed that all of Iran’s nuclear sites had been completely destroyed by “beautiful” aircraft, a feat no other army had accomplished.
Following the serious incident in December in Iran, Trump intensified tensions further. The first layer was a media campaign: media aligned with Trump launched a bombardment of anti-Iran propaganda. Subsequently, the second layer of pressure—actual military threats—began. The aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, accompanied by its strike group, moved toward Iranian waters, followed eventually by the Gerald Ford.
Amid these threats and noise, one fact was overlooked but practically admitted by the Americans, despite Trump’s claims: these “beautiful” aircraft were incapable of destroying Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Otherwise, there would have been no point in resuming disputes and negotiations.
Returning to the main issue, Trump pursued psychological warfare and threats using media and military pressure in an attempt to extract concessions from Iranian officials. Apparently, Iranian authorities are not afraid of Trump’s threats and are prepared for all scenarios.
Now, the real, unfiltered, and straightforward core of the issue involves Trump and Iran. At this level, war and agreement are simultaneously both very distant and very near. If negotiations focus on ensuring that Iran does not obtain nuclear weapons, with guarantees set accordingly, then the percentage of uranium enrichment can be set at the level agreed upon in the JCPOA—or slightly more or less. This option guarantees the chance of an agreement and represents a win-win solution.
However, if Iran’s missiles become part of the negotiations, the talks are doomed to fail, and war becomes inevitable. In that case, it is clear that such a devastating and extensive war would have no winner and the outcome would be a lose-lose scenario. Therefore, depending on what is placed on the negotiation table, agreement is simultaneously very near and very far—and similarly, war is both very near and very far.
Dr. Seyyed Javad Sajadi
