Denying the Past is Today’s Mistake: A Response to Claims About Imam Khomeini’s Leadership Over Afghan Shiites

My dear friend, Mr. Asadullah Saadati, in a critique of an interview of Mr. Mohiuddin Mahdi, denied the leadership of Imam Khomeini (may God have mercy on him) over Afghan Shiites.

Mr. Mahdi, in that interview, referred to a clause in the statute of the Unity Party, which states: “The Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan will continue its jihad and struggle until the establishment of an Islamic system based on the Quran, Sunnah, and the principle of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih).” Considering that the example of Wilayat al-Faqih at the time of the party’s formation was Imam Khomeini (may God have mercy on him), he made such a claim. In response, Mr. Saadati wrote: “This claim, regardless of whatever intention or motive it has, is a false claim, ungrounded talk, an unjust and unforgivable accusation.”

In my view, Mr. Saadati’s criticism of that claim is neither valid, nor in line with historical facts, nor a solution to today’s problems.

Avoiding acceptance of Imam Khomeini’s leadership was probably intended to reduce suspicions of dependence on Iran. However, this denial will practically yield no benefit for the deniers.

To clarify the matter, I find it necessary to present the following points:

1. The Unity Party was, without any doubt, formed with the support and backing of Iran, and the two secretaries-general in its early years (Martyr Mazari and Mr. Akbari) were trusted and supported figures of Iran and indeed considered the standard-bearers of the theory of following the absolute guardianship of the jurist in Afghanistan.

2. Alignment with Iran for the Unity Party, which was a Shiite and ideological party, was a natural matter. That important clause in the statute identifying the party as a follower of the Wilayat al-Faqih was not due to the lack of understanding or attention by the party’s leaders of its meaning, but was deliberate and based on the aspirations of those leaders, and all the leaders of the party, including Martyr Mazari, had a deep belief in Wilayat al-Faqih and the religious obligation to obey him.

3. The referent of “Wilayat al-Faqih” mentioned in the statute of the Unity Party, at the time of its foundation, was specifically and exclusively Imam Khomeini (may God have mercy on him), and after him, Ayatollah Khamenei. None of the party’s central council members at that time doubted this matter, although in later years some tried to divert the party from following the path of Wilayat al-Faqih.

4. There can be valid criticisms of Iran’s interactions with developments in Afghanistan, especially regarding the Shiites, which I have sometimes addressed as well. But distorting historical realities, possibly due to calculations of current interests and harms, is certainly detrimental to us and does not solve any problem.

5. Imam Khomeini, besides being the supreme religious authority for Shiites worldwide at that time, was recognized as the leader of an anti-imperialist movement, and various groups in different lands regarded him as their revolutionary leader. Many Afghan Shiites, including the Unity Party leaders, proudly followed Imam Khomeini during that revolutionary idealistic period, just as others in the same era proudly followed Lenin and his successors, or Sayyid Qutb and his followers.

6. Critics may assess the actions of Shiite leaders in the 1980s and say whether their following of Imam Khomeini was a prudent act or not; but concealing the reality is neither reasonable nor fair.

I am puzzled about what benefit denying the Unity Party’s relationship with Iran in the 1990s and the secretary-general and the vast majority of its members’ allegiance to Imam Khomeini has. Will this denial make the Taliban and Salafists trust us, or will it earn trust from the U.S. and the West? Certainly not.

7. Afghan Shiites are compelled to pursue a plan that ensures power politics for them. What the leaders of Shiite ethnic parties have sought in the past 25 years has been merely political power through ethnicity, not the design of power politics, which ultimately did not succeed.

Coincidentally, both relatively successful experiences of short-term council rule over Hazarajat and the Unity Party’s governance of central regions were based on uniting all capacities around religious grounds. This dominance ended when the ethnic element replaced the religious element, and the party collapsed from within.

Afghan Shiites now need to redefine the mechanism to move toward power politics with focus on religious foundations. Perhaps we need to redefine our relations with other Shiite power centers abroad, but ignoring them is not in our favor and will place us in newer and more unsupported predicaments.

Seyed Ahmad Mousavi, Preacher