Taliban Boycotts Tehran Summit, Citing Strategic and Ideological Divides with Iran

From Tactical Trade to Security Refusals

The Taliban declined to participate in a meeting of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries in Tehran, asserting that it had no need for such initiatives.

This move appears to be more than a mere diplomatic slight.

Evidence suggests that over the past four years, the Taliban has not established any definitive, irreversible relationships with Iran. All interactions between the Taliban and Iran have remained tactical, reversible, and non-strategic in nature.

For instance, even if statistics indicate a temporary increase in financial and trade exchanges with Iran, this does not signify a strategic economic pivot by the Taliban toward Tehran. Rather, these measures are seen as tactical moves aimed at pressuring other trade partners. Once these alternative avenues become more profitable, the Taliban is likely to reduce its trade with Iran significantly.

One example is Afghanistan’s fuel imports. The Taliban now sources a major portion of its fuel from Russia rather than Iran, using Iranian routes solely for transportation.

In effect, there is little indication that the Taliban seeks to establish deep, strategic, and irreversible ties with Iran.

In this context, it is not surprising that the Taliban chooses not to participate meaningfully in regional processes initiated by Iran.

The Taliban’s stance is driven by two main reasons.

First, it harbors fundamental ideological differences with Iran. The experience of groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and its leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani in Syria illustrates that Salafi-oriented movements can reach understandings with the US and the West for pragmatic reasons. However, they often face serious identity and religious barriers in forging close ties with Shiite governments. The Taliban, as a Salafi-influenced movement, is no exception. This ideological divergence remains a substantial obstacle to deeper Afghanistan-Iran relations, regardless of superficial gestures of goodwill.

Second, the Taliban is bound by the Doha Agreement with the United States, under which it committed to not establishing close relationships with America’s adversaries, particularly regarding security matters. As such, the group cannot engage in sensitive regional security affairs without aligning with Washington’s strategic outlook.

This explains why the Taliban refrains from attending regional security summits initiated by Iran.

Given this context, one should not be surprised if, for instance, Sirajuddin Haqqani had initially promised to attend the Tehran summit on Afghanistan’s neighbors as a surprise visit, but later declined under U.S. pressure and intimidation.

By Seyed Ahmad Mousavi Mobalegh