Opinion: What Is My Stance on the Taliban-Pakistan Dispute?
Following the recent tensions and disputes between the Taliban and Pakistan, many may be wondering: where do we stand in all this? This is a question independent of social status or academic background—anyone may grapple with it. I too have questioned my position amid the Taliban-Pakistan tensions, and I wish to share my conclusion, acknowledging that others may arrive at different ones.
Since its inception, Pakistan has used religious sentiments among the masses to pursue its political and economic objectives both domestically and abroad. The creation, training, and support of religious extremist groups within Pakistan and across the region have been consistent elements of Islamabad’s 78-year-old policy. No major extremist religious group has emerged in the region without significant fingerprints of Pakistan—particularly its military and intelligence agencies.
The origins of the Taliban in 1994 (1373 in the Persian calendar) similarly reveal a clear role played by Pakistan. While some experts believe Pakistan created the Taliban, I argue that it did not create but rather supported and organized the group. The distinction lies in the nuance: creation implies negating the sociopolitical conditions that led to the group’s emergence, while support acknowledges them and seeks to strengthen the phenomenon. By this definition, the Taliban emerged from the Afghan context but would not have reached their current position without foreign—particularly Pakistani—support.
As stated, Pakistan began supporting and organizing the Taliban three decades ago for its strategic interests in the region, facilitating the movement’s growth in Afghanistan. Earlier, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services had used religious and militant groups to pursue influence in Kashmir, and they applied the same playbook in Afghanistan. Throughout both its earlier rule and the war against foreign forces and the former republican government, the Taliban remained closely backed by Pakistan. Pakistan’s security apparatus provided safe havens and fostered ideological allies like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in tribal regions, later merging these groups with the Taliban.
This longstanding support came at a cost. Supporting extremist groups imposed heavy burdens on both the Pakistani state and public. Still, given the strategic benefits, the Pakistani military tolerated them. However, when the Afghan Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August 2021 (Asad 1400 in the Persian calendar), the equation shifted. The Afghan Taliban became less reliant on Pakistan’s intelligence and security backing, while their success inspired the TTP to assert independence from Pakistani control in its tribal regions. Tensions between the Pakistani military and the TTP escalated, drawing in the Afghan Taliban due to their historical ties with the TTP.
Thus, the current tension between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan centers exclusively on the TTP. Were it not for the TTP’s dissent, the relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan would likely remain close and cordial. This dispute is not rooted in Afghanistan’s national interests but stems from the conflict between Pakistan and the TTP. Despite the fallout, no group in Afghanistan is as well-positioned as the Taliban to represent Pakistani interests in the region due to their deep religious, political, and social ties to Pakistan.
Returning to the question—what is our stance in this conflict? As discussed, the root of the dispute is the TTP’s rebellion against its former patrons in Pakistan’s intelligence and military. Such ideological and extremist groups often behave like Frankenstein’s monster, potentially turning on their creators. That is what the TTP has done, inadvertently dragging the Afghan Taliban into the conflict. Therefore, this is not a bilateral conflict between two states but a domestic dispute between a former patron and its offshoots. Politically and logically, it is an internal crisis involving Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and the TTP—three groups once united now divided.
So where do I, you, and the Afghan people stand in this? Nowhere. Afghan citizens were not stakeholders in the previous Taliban-Pakistan alliance and play no role in its fracture. On the contrary, Afghans have endured devastating consequences from that alliance. Countless innocent lives have been lost, homes, schools, roads, hospitals, and public infrastructure destroyed—largely due to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban. Every drop of blood spilled in the past three decades has had the shadow of Pakistan’s intelligence and military presence behind it. In truth, Pakistan’s destructive role in Afghanistan predates even this recent history.
Given this, my concern regarding the Taliban-Pakistan dispute is not patriotic or nationalistic—I view it as an internal matter between Pakistan and its former proxy, the Taliban, over the TTP. I take no nationalistic stance here. However, I also do not support Pakistan in any capacity, for two reasons. First, Pakistan is a rogue state whose actions have wrought enduring harm in Afghanistan, embedding trauma in our national memory. Supporting one form of malevolence to counter another is not rational. Second, advocating for a violent clash between Pakistan and the Taliban is to endorse war and bloodshed in our shared home—Afghanistan. While the Taliban, as wayward stewards of our homeland, have deprived many of civil, political, and social rights, siding with Pakistan means siding with an aggressor against one’s own people.
In conclusion, my stance in the Taliban-Pakistan dispute is now clear: this is a personal, internal matter between Pakistan and its former ally and holds no patriotic value for me. I will not support Pakistan—directly or indirectly—for I refuse to contribute, even through a word or a sentence, to the destruction of Afghanistan and the spilling of innocent blood.
— Mohammad Moradi
