Pakistan’s Airstrikes Redefine Its Role in the Taliban Equation
In a recent Pakistani airstrike targeting four locations in Afghanistan, including Kabul, at least two senior officials of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were confirmed killed. Khalid Mehsud and Saif-ud-Din, prominent figures within the group, were among the dead, while the status of Noor Wali Mehsud remains unclear, with the authenticity of the audio file attributed to him yet to be verified.
Islamabad has not officially claimed responsibility for these attacks and has implicitly pointed to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) as responsible.
This approach carries two clear messages: 1. It demonstrates that Afghanistan remains a key card in Pakistan’s regional strategy and that Islamabad regards itself as the main and decisive player shaping developments in the region. Pakistan is effectively trying to prove that no sustainable order in Afghanistan can be established without its involvement.
2. Pakistan uses these strikes as an indirect signal to convey that the United States has concluded the Taliban have failed to control terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Consequently, CENTCOM is authorized to operate directly within Afghan territory, with Pakistan playing a coordinating role in this framework. Furthermore, CENTCOM’s interventions via Pakistan could potentially take on additional dimensions in Afghanistan’s affairs.
The airstrikes also send a clear warning to Taliban leaders. They indicate that the “policy of physical elimination” remains an option on Islamabad’s table—a measure that could be activated should the Taliban deviate from the lines set by Pakistan.
Pakistan does not consider this action as an invasion of a neighboring country but rather as a form of “internal control” over a group that has come under Islamabad’s influence and design in the region, with an expectation that the Taliban remain compliant.
Given its deep influence within Taliban’s layers, Pakistan is also capable of directly removing noncompliant Taliban officials but has refrained from doing so for now.
One key rationale behind this policy is Pakistan’s effort to curb the rising anti-government sentiment among Pakistani Pashtuns.
Islamabad understands well that to control the warlike tendencies among Pakistani Pashtuns, it needs to transfer religious authority outside Pakistan’s borders to issue a fatwa forbidding jihad within Pakistan.
In line with this, the Pashtun religious authority has been moved from Pakistan to Kandahar so that the Pashtunwali religious movement there can be directed according to Pakistan’s interests.
The elimination of figures such as Mawlawi Samiul Haq and his son can also likely be analyzed within this context—that is, to prevent the emergence of an independent Pashtun religious center inside Pakistan and to concentrate authority in Kandahar.
Alongside these measures, Pakistan has created a circle of religious and intellectual figures loyal to itself within the Taliban structure, ensuring that if the need arises to remove Mullah Haibatullah, this “religious axis” remains intact and a ready successor is available.
The rising prominence of figures like Mawlawi Hakim Haqqani and Mawlawi Islam Jar, along with organized promotion around them, signals this ongoing process.
Moreover, in addition to these objectives, Pakistan’s recent airstrikes pursue other regional goals.
By drawing closer again to Washington and playing the role of an “anti-terrorism ally,” Islamabad is effectively distancing itself from the Moscow-Beijing-Tehran axis.
This shift could undermine initiatives such as the Moscow format or China’s projects in Afghanistan, as well as Iran’s relations with the Taliban.
India, which recently viewed the situation as an opportunity to increase its influence within the Taliban—Afghan Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi was in Delhi during the Pakistani strikes—is another challenge Pakistan faces in the region. These airstrikes likely serve as necessary warnings to Kandahar and Kabul on this matter.
Meanwhile, last night, news sources reported border clashes between Taliban forces and the Pakistani military in border areas of Kunar, Nangarhar, and Paktia provinces.
This border skirmish was a symbolic Taliban response to Pakistan’s airstrikes. While it has little impact on the existing situation, it might serve as a trap by Pakistan to justify larger operations against the Taliban—especially if Pakistan claims that international assistance is needed to “combat terrorism” within Taliban-controlled areas, thereby enabling CENTCOM’s direct involvement in the conflict.
Seyed Ahmad Mousavi Moballegh
